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Abstract
We provide a double encryption algorithm that uses the lack of invertibility of the frac-
tional Fourier transform (FRFT) on L1. One encryption key is a function, which maps a
“good” L2(R) signal to a “bad” L1(R) signal. The FRFT parameter which describes the rota-
tion associated with this operator on the time-frequency plane provides the other encryption
key. With the help of approximate identities, such as of the Abel and Gauss means of the
FRFT established in [3], we recover the encrypted signal on the FRFT domain. This design
of an encryption algorithm seems new even when using the classical Fourier transform.
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1 Introduction
In view of the rapid development of communication and multimedia technology, the acqui-
sition, transmission and processing of private data is of paramount importance in our digital era.
Alongside with the development of digital technology, security concerns arise as a major under-
taking. The implementation of data encryption and related algorithm research are key pillars to
solving these problems. In the past decade, scholars have applied this research in various fields,
such as telemedicine, patient data secure filing, voice communication, satellite transmission
signal, and so on; on this we refer to [4, 7, 11, 13, 21, 29, 31] and references therein.
In the last two decades, the fractional Fourier transform (FRFT) has been widely favored in
engineering, in view of its free parameters, its suitability in dealing with rotations in the time-
frequency plane, and its convenience in algorithm adaptation; in fact, a number of algorithms
have been established based on the FRFT. Moreover, the FRFT has found applications in aspects
of research, such as artificial neural network, wavelet transform, time-frequency analysis, time-
varying filtering, complex transmission and so on (see, e.g., [5, 16, 18, 24, 26, 28]). Moreover,
it has also been used in partial differential equations (cf., [14, 17]), quantum mechanics (cf.,
[17, 23]), diffraction theory and optical transmission (cf., [21]), optical system and optical signal
processing (cf., [1, 12, 20]), optical image processing (cf., [12, 14]), etc. Earlier theoretical
aspects of the FRFT can be found in [9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 30].
The FRFT can be interpreted as a form of the Fourier transform which incorporates a rota-
tion of the coordinate axis on which the original signal is defined; this rotation is given counter-
clockwise about the origin in the time-frequency plane. Theoretically, we introduce the FRFT
as an operator on L1(R) as follows: For u ∈ L1(R) and α ∈ R, the fractional Fourier transform
of order α of u is defined by
(Fαu)(x) =

∫ +∞
−∞ Kα(x, t)u(t) dt, α , npi, n ∈ N,
u(x), α = 2npi,
u(−x), α = (2n + 1)pi,
(1.1)
where
Kα(x, t) = Aα exp
[
2pii
(
t2
2
cotα − xt cscα + x
2
2
cotα
)]
is the kernel of FRFT and
Aα =
√
1 − i cotα. (1.2)
It is obvious that when α = pi/2, the FRFT reduces to the ordinary Fourier transform, that is,
Fpi/2 = F . Recall that the Fourier transform of u defined as
(F u)(x) =
∫ +∞
−∞
u(t)e−2piixtdt. (1.3)
If the Fourier transformation of a signal is another signal that lives on an axis perpendicular to
the original signal time axis, the αth FRFT of a signal lives on the counterclockwise rotation by
the angle α of the original signal time axis.
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To the best of our knowledge, researchers have only applied the L2 theory of FRFT and
did not consider an L1 theory. As the FRFT of L1-signal, Fαu, may not be integrable in gen-
eral, we cannot invert the FRFT on L1. In [3], we developed the harmonic analysis theoretical
background that addresses FRFT inversion issues of an L1-signal via summability techniques.
Based on our earlier research and inspired by the above literature, in this paper, we use this
approximate inversion to study the signal encryption from a new perspective.
2 Mathematical background
In this section, we recall properties of FRFT and analyze their numerical adaptation. Define
the chirp operatorMα acting on functions φ in L1(R) as follows:
Mαφ(x) = epiix2 cotαφ(x).
For α , npi, let Aα be as in (1.2). Then the FRFT of u ∈ L1(R) can be written as
(Fαu)(x) = Aαeipix2 cotα(F eipi(·)2 cotαu)(x cscα)
= AαMα(FMαu)(x cscα). (2.1)
In view of (2.1), we see that the FRFT of a signal u(t) can be decomposed into four simpler
operators, according to the diagram of Fig. 2.1:
(i) chirp modulation, v(t) = epiit
2 cotαu(t);
(ii) Fourier transform, vˆ(x) = (F v)(x);
(iii) scaling, v˜(x) = vˆ(x cscα);
(iv) chirp modulation, (Fαu)(x) = Aαepiix2 cotαv˜(x).
u(t) ×
eipit
2cotα
FT Scaling ×
Aαeipix
2cotα
(Fαu)(x)
v(t) vˆ(x) v˜(x)
Figure 2.1: the decomposition of the FRFT
Generally speaking, the FRFT was studied on the Schwartz space S (R) or on L2(R). Thanks
to topological properties of these spaces, the operator Fα on S (R) or L2(R) is unitary, invertible
(with inverse transform F−α) and forms an additive group (i.e., Fα1Fα2 = Fα1+α2). However,
many common functions do not belong to S (R) or L2(R). For example, the following useful
signal on the line
u(t) =
{
n, n ≤ t < n + 1n3 ,
0, otherwise. (2.2)
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lies in L1(R) but not in L2(R). Using (1.1), we calculate the FRFT of this function:
(Fαu) (x) = Aαe
ipix2 cotα
2piix
∞∑
n=1
ne−2npiix
(
1 − e− 2piixn3
)
,
where Aα is as in (1.2).
In the L1(R) setting, problems of convergence arise when studying FRFT inversion. Given
the FRFT of an L1-signal of in fractional Fourier domain, how to recover it back into time
domain to be the original signal? We naturally hope that
(F−αFαu)(t) =
∫ +∞
−∞
(Fαu)(x)K−α(x, t)dx = u(t) (2.3)
Unfortunately, when u is integrable, one may not necessarily have that Fαu is integrable, so the
integral in (2.3) might not make sense. In fact, Fαu is nonintegrable in general (cf., [6, pp. 12]).
For example, let
u(t) = e−piit
2 |t|−1/2 rect(t). (2.4)
Then u ∈ L1(R) but
U(x) :=
(Fpi/4u) (x) = 23/4Aαeipix2C
(√
23/2
pi
|x|
)
√|x| < L
1(R). (2.5)
Then F−αFαu does not make sense. Here rect(t) is the rectangle function on the line defined by
rect(t) =
{
1, |t| ≤ 1,
0, |t| > 1,
and C(x) is the Fresnel cosine integral function defined by C(x) =
∫ x
0
cos pis
2
2 ds.
In order to overcome the difficulty of non-integrability and recover the original signal, we
adopt the idea of inversion via summability means, established in our earlier work [3].
Definition 2.1. Given Φ ∈ C0(R) and Φ(0) = 1, a function u, and ε > 0 we define
Mε,Φα(u) :=
∫ +∞
−∞
(Fαu)(x)K−α(x, ·)Φα(εx)dx,
where
Φα (x) := Φ (x cscα) .
The expressions Mε,Φα(u) (with varying ε) are called the Φα means of the fractional Fourier
integral of u.
The following results concern FRFT approximate identities.
Theorem 2.1. If Φ,FΦ ∈ L1(R) and ‖FΦ‖L1 = 1, then the Φα means of the fractional Fourier
integral of u are convergent to u in the sense of L1 norm, that is,
lim
ε→0
∥∥∥Mε,Φα(u) − u∥∥∥L1 = 0.
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Theorem 2.2. Suppose that Φ,FΦ lie in L1(R) and that the function ψ(x) = sup
|t|≥|x|
|(FΦ) (t)| is
integrable over the line and ‖FΦ‖L1 = 1. Then the Φα means of the fractional Fourier integral
of f are a.e. convergent to f , that is,
Mε,Φα(u)(t)→ u (t)
as ε→ 0 for almost all t ∈ R.
Even if Fαu is non-integrable, once multiplied by a smooth cutoff, its inverse FRFT can be
defined. Then, in view of theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we can reconstruct the original signal u as a
limit of the Φα means of Fαu as ε→ 0.
In engineering applications, it is necessary to calculate the discrete fractional Fourier trans-
form (DFRFT). It is not surprising that the numerical implementation of the DFRFT is more
complicated than that of the ordinary discrete Fourier transform (DFT). At present, there are
various types of fast DFRFT algorithms with different processing methods and variable accu-
racy (cf., [2, 19, 22, 25]). These form the basis for the successful application of FRFT in signal
processing. A basic point in the definition of the discrete FRFT is its sufficient proximity to the
continuous FRFT. To recover the original signal from the fractional Fourier domain back to the
time domain, one usually tries to numerically calculate the FRFT of order −pi/4 of (2.5). If we
ignore the domain of the original signal in the implementation of the algorithm, we will not be
able to successfully restore the signal. For example, the discrete algorithm through sampling
of FRFT introduced by Ozaktas [19] is one of the most widely used one. This decomposes the
FRFT into a discrete signal convolution, and its output is close to the continuous FRFTFαu. But
in Fig. 2.2 we can see that crucial information of the original signal (2.4) is lost. The essential
reason is that (2.5) is not integrable.
3 Signal encryption and decryption
3.1 Encryption algorithm
From the perspective of signal encryption, the difficulty of the FRFT inversion problem of
L1 functions can be used to improve the security of the encryption. Specifically, for a real-
valued signal u, we first map it to a signal v which lies in L1(R)\L2(R), and then through the
fractional Fourier transform, we obtain the encrypted signal ue = Fαv; here and in the sequel,
the superscript e indicates the encryption process and the superscript d indicates the decryption
process. This kind of encryption based on FRFT usually needs to use the inverse FRFT F−α
when decrypting. However, as mentioned above, the inverse transform F−αue does not make
sense if ue < L1(R). This presents deciphering complications, even if the secret key α is known.
The FRFT is a common and efficient tool in signal encryption. The difficulty of deciphering
can be enhanced by adding keys such as the multiple iterations in [11], combinations with the
jigsaw transform [7], joint transform correlators [29], the region shift encoding [4], chaotic
maps [31], multiple-phase codes [13], etc. This article only focuses on algorithms involving
special properties of FRFT on L1(R).
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Figure 2.2: The (a) real parts, (b) imaginary parts, (c) magnitudes and (d) phases of the original
signal u (represented by red line) and F−pi/4U, the signal obtain by Ozaktas DFRFT of order
−pi/4 (represented by black line).
Theorem 3.1. For any bounded function u and ω ∈ L1(R) \ L2(R) with ω(t) , 0 for t ∈ R, let
Pωu = uω := (u + M)ω, M = 1 + supt∈R |u(t)|. Then uω ∈ L1(R) \ L2(R).
Proof. Because 1 ≤ u(t) + M ≤ 2M, then∫ +∞
−∞
|uω(t)| dx =
∫ +∞
−∞
|u(t) + M| |ω(t)|dt
≤ 2M
∫ +∞
−∞
|ω(t)| dt < +∞,
and ∫ +∞
−∞
|uω(t)|2 dx =
∫ +∞
−∞
|u(t) + M|2 |ω(t)|2dt
≥
∫ +∞
−∞
|ω(t)|2 dt = +∞.
Then, we have uω ∈ L1(R) and uω < L2(R). The desired result is proved. 
Consider the following examples:
ω1(t) =
n∑
i=1
|t − τi|−1/2 χ[−k,k], k ∈ R+, τi ∈ [−k, k], i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (3.1)
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ω2(t) =
∞∑
n=1
(√
nχ( 1n+1 , 1n ](|t|) +
1
(n + 1)2
χ(n,n+1](|t|)
)
, (3.2)
where χ[a,b] denotes the characteristic function of the interval [a, b].
The function in (3.1) is a linear combination of functions of type (2.4), and obviously lies
in L1(R) \ L2(R). Also,
ω2(t) =
{ √
n, 1n+1 < |t| ≤ 1n ,
1
(n+1)2 n < |t| ≤ n + 1, n = 1, 2, . . . .
We have ∫
R
|ω2(t)| dt = 2
∞∑
n=1
∫ 1
n
1
n+1
√
n dt + 2
∞∑
n=1
∫ n+1
n
1
(n + 1)2
dt
= 2
∞∑
n=1
1√
n(n + 1)
+ 2
∞∑
n=1
1
(n + 1)2
< ∞
and ∫
R
|ω2(t)|2 dt = 2
∞∑
n=1
∫ 1
n
1
n+1
n dt + 2
∞∑
n=1
∫ n+1
n
1
(n + 1)4
dt
≥ 2
∞∑
n=1
1
n + 1
= ∞.
Remark 3.1. Denote by Qωuω := uωω −M, then it is easy to see that Qωuω = u. For example, let
u(t) = rect(t), ω = ω1. Then Pωu ∈ L1(R) \ L2(R) and Qωuω = u(t) = rect(t).
Let u be a bounded signal function to be encrypted. In this paper, we always assume that
u is a real-valued function. First, we randomly select an n-dimensional sequence {τi} ∈ [−k, k]
and then pick a function ω as in (3.1) to map u to uω. By Theorem 3.1, uω ∈ L1(R) \ L2(R).
Then, through the FRFT of order α, we get the encrypted signal ue = Fαuω. In view of the chirp
decomposition of FRFT (Equ. 2.1), the encryption process can be divided into the following
steps, according to the diagram of Fig. 3.1:
(i) mapping u into L1(R) \ L2(R): uω = Pωu;
(ii) chirp modulation: v(t) = epiit
2 cotαuω(t);
(iii) Fourier transformation (with scale variation): vˆ(x) = (F v) (x cscα);
(iv) chirp modulation: ue(x) = Aαepiix
2 cotαvˆ(x) = Fαuω.
In this way, we obtain the encrypted signal in the fractional fourier domain, which can be
expressed as
ue(x) = (FαPωu)(x) =
∫ +∞
−∞
Kα(x, t)(u(t) + M)ω(t) dt, (3.3)
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Figure 3.1: the process of encryption algorithm
where M = 1 + supt∈R |u(t)|.
Here, the algorithm has two secret keys: the operator Pω (including sequence {τi}) and the
order α of FRFT. The keys here provide high security. On the one hand, the assurance that
ue(x) is not integrable, provides instability in the reconstruction of the original signal through
the inverse FRFT, as mentioned above. On the other hand, it is known that the operator Fα is
not continuous in the order α, that is, Fβ may not map to Fα as β → α. Therefore, it cannot be
decrypted properly when the order α is unknown.
3.2 Decryption algorithm
In spaces where an inverse transform is inoperative, in order to introduce the decryption
algorithm, we study inversion by adopting approximate identities. We focus on two functions
that give rise to special Φα means (Definition 2.1). Denote by
aα (x) = e−2piε|cscα||x| and gα (x) = e−4pi
2εx2 csc2 α. (3.4)
The Φα means
Mε,aα(u) :=
∫ +∞
−∞
(Fαu)(x)K−α(x, ·)e−2piε|cscα||x|dx
and
Mε,gα(u) :=
∫ +∞
−∞
(Fαu)(x)K−α(x, ·)e−4pi2εx2 csc2 αdx
are called the Abel mean and Gauss mean of the fractional Fourier integral of u, respectively.
The following results are well-known.
Lemma 3.2 ([8, 27]). Let ε > 0. Then
(a) F
[
e−2piε| · |
]
(x) = 1
pi
ε
ε2+x2 =: Pε (x) (Poisson kernel);
(b) F
[
e−4pi
2ε| · |2] (x) = 1
(4piε)1/2
e−x
2/4ε =: Gε (x) (Gauss kernel).
(c) Gε, Pε ∈ L1(R);
(d)
∫ +∞
−∞ Gε(x) dx =
∫ +∞
−∞ Pε(x) dx = 1.
Combining with theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we can obtain the following results immediately.
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Figure 3.2: the process of decryption algorithm
Theorem 3.3. The Abel and Gauss means of the fractional Fourier integral of ue (the encrypted
signal) converge to uω in the sense of L1 norm and a.e., that is,
(i) lim
ε→0
∥∥∥F−α(e−2piε|cscα||x|ue) − uω∥∥∥L1 = 0,
lim
ε→0
∥∥∥F−α(e−4pi2εx2 csc2 αue) − uω∥∥∥L1 = 0;
(ii) lim
ε→0
F−α(e−2piε|cscα||x|ue)(t) = uω(t) for a. e. t ∈ R,
lim
ε→0
F−α(e−4pi2εx2 csc2 αue)(t) = uω(t) for a. e. t ∈ R.
Remark 3.2. From the expressions of the kernel functions in (3.4), it is obvious that the nu-
merical implementation of function aα (x) is less demanding than that of function gα (x). So in
the following encryption algorithm, we choose the function aα (x) and use the fractional Abel
means to approximate the original signal.
Given an encrypted signal ue, we can obtain the associated decrypted signal ud by taking the
Abel means of the fractional Fourier integral of ue with ε small enough. The decryption process
may be divided into the following steps according to the diagram of Fig. 3.2:
(i) multiplication by the Abel function aα (x): vˆε(x) = ue(x)e−2piε|cscα||x|;
(ii) inverse FRFT: vε(t) = (F−αvˆε)(t)
(iii) action by Qω: udε(t) = Qωvε(t).
This process can be simply described as
udε(t) = Qω
[
Mε,aαu
]
(t) = Qω[F−α(e−2piε|cscα||x|ue)](t). (3.5)
Through the aforementioned method, we can restore the encrypted signal ue(x) from the
fractional Fourier domain back to the time domain. Since u is a real-valued signal, the amplitude
of the signal udε can approximate the original signal u as ε → 0, in view of Theorem 3.3 (as in
Fig. 4.2). In other words, for ε sufficiently small, the error between the decrypted signal udε
and the original signal u can be arbitrarily small. Furthermore, accuracy is improved when
the parameter ε gets smaller. Replacing ue(t) by the “Abel average” ue(t)aα (t) yields improved
smoothness and results in fewer discretization errors.
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Figure 4.1: (a) The original signal sect (t); (b) the real and imaginary part graphs of the en-
crypted signal ue(t); the decrypted signal ud with (c) incorrect key α = 0.245pi and (d) correct
key α = 0.25pi for ε = 10−14.
4 Simulation examples
We take a unit rectangular signal u(t) = rect(t) as an example. Here we randomly select a
sequence {τi} ∈ [−1.1, 1.1] and let ω(t) =
n∑
i=1
|t − τi|−1/2 χ[−1.1,1.1] as in (3.1). Denote by
uω(t) := Pωu(t) =
n∑
i=1
|t − τi|−1/2 rect(t).
Then uω ∈ L1(R) but uω < L2(R). Take the fractional order α = pi/4 as a secret key. Through the
pi/4-th FRFT of uω, we get the encrypted signal ue = Fpi/4uω (see Fig. 4.1 (b)) in the fractional
Fourier domain. Similar to (2.4), we can see that ue < L1(R) and the inverse FRFT∫ +∞
−∞
ue(x)K−pi/4(x, t)dx (4.1)
do not make sense.
In order to recover the original signal u(t), we should use the approximating method, that is,
take the Abel means of the integral (4.1)
uε,ω(t) = A−α
∫ +∞
−∞
ue(x)K−pi/4(x, t)e−2piε|cscα||x|dx. (4.2)
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Figure 4.2: (a) The decrypted signal uε,ω(t) obtained by Abel means with various ε and (b)
the error for ε = 10−14; (c) the decrypted signal uε,ω(t) obtained by Ozaktas’ discrete FRFT
algorithm and (d) the error for ε = 10−14.
By Theorem 3.3, we know that uε,ω(t)→ uω(t) for a.e. t ∈ R as ε→ 0, as shown in Fig. 4.2 (a).
Fig. 4.1 (d) shows the decrypted signal ud(t) obtaining by take Abel means of the integral (4.1)
with ε = 10−14. Here, the numerical accuracy achieves the order of magnitude of 10−8. The
Ozaktas’ discrete FRFT algorithm is one of the most commonly used and effective algorithms.
But for this example, the error of the decrypted signal obtained with it reaches up to the order
of magnitude of 102, as shown in Fig. 4.2. In summary, the encryption method proposed in this
paper guarantees the security of the encryption process regardless the way of the decryption or
the security of secret keys.
5 Connections with Fractional Fourier multipliers
In signal encryption, FRFT is often used in combination with other transforms or operators,
as mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.1. Fourier multipliers are operators defined by
altering the Fourier transform by multiplication; these play an important role in mathematical
analysis and signal processing. The authors’ previous work [3] introduced Fourier multipliers
in the FRFT context. In this section, we combine these with the encryption algorithm described
in Section 3 to a new multiple encryption.
Let 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ and mα ∈ L∞(R). Define the operator Tmα as
Fα (Tmα f ) (x) = mα (x) (Fα f ) (x) , ∀ f ∈ L2(R) ∩ Lp(R). (5.1)
11
Figure 5.1: the process of encryption algorithm
The function mα is called the Lp Fourier multiplier of order α, if there exist a constant Cp,α > 0
such that ∥∥∥Tmα f ∥∥∥p ≤ Cp,α ‖ f ‖p , ∀ f ∈ L2(R) ∩ Lp(R). (5.2)
As L2(R) ∩ Lp(R) is dense in Lp(R), there is a unique bounded extension of Tmα in Lp(R) satis-
fying (5.2). This extension is also denoted by Tmα and
Tmα f = F−α
[
mα (Fα f )] .
Given an L2-signal u to be encrypted. Let Tmβ be the operator associated with a fractional
Lp multipler mβ. Then Tmβu ∈ L2(R). Next, repeat the encryption process as in Fig. 3.1 for Tmβu
and we get the encrypted signal ue. According to the diagram of Fig. 5.1, ue can be expressed
as
ue = Fα
[
Pω
(
Tmβu
)]
.
In view of Fig. 3.2, the decryption process is shown in Fig. 5.2 and
udε = T
−1
mβ
(
QωMε,aαu
e) = F−βm−1β Fβ [QωF−α (e−2piε|cscα||x|ue)] .
Figure 5.2: the process of decryption algorithm
In view of (5.1), many important fractional integral operators can be expressed in terms of
fractional Lp multiplier, for example the fractional Hilbert transform. Recall that the classical
Hilbert transform is defined as
(Hu)(t) = p.v. 1
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
u(τ)
t − τdτ. (5.3)
The Hilbert transform of order β is defined as (cf., [30])
(Hβu)(t) = p.v. e
−ipit2 cot β
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
u(τ)eipiτ
2 cot β
t − τ dτ. (5.4)
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For 1 < p < ∞, the operator Hβ is bounded from Lp(R) to Lp(R). By [30, Theorem 4], we see
that mβ = −isgn ((pi − β)ω′) is a fractional Lp multiplier and the associated operator Tmβ is the
fractional Hilbert transform, that is,
(FβHβu) (ω′) = −isgn ((pi − β)ω′) (Fβu) (ω′) . (5.5)
Without loss of generality, assume that β ∈ (0, pi). It can be seen from (5.5) that the Hilbert
transform of order β is a phase-shift converter that multiplies the positive portion in β-th frac-
tional Fourier domain of signal u by −i, that is, maintaining the same amplitude, shifts the phase
by −pi/2, while the negative portion of Fβu is shifted by pi/2. As shown in Fig. 5.3.
ω
Im t
Re t
ω′
(a)
ω
Im t
Re t
ω′
(b)
t
ω
ω′
FβF pi
2
(c)
Figure 5.3: Hilbert transform of order β in β-th fractional Fourier domain ((a) the original signal:
Fβ(u)(ω′); (b) after Hilbert transform: Fβ(Hβu)(ω′); (c) rotation of time-frequency plane)
Take Tmβ = Hβ and ω as in (3.1) as an example. The encryption process shown in Fig. 5.1
can be divided into the following steps:
(i) phase shifting, u1 = Hβu: shifting the phase of positive portion of the original signal u in
β-th Fourier domain by −pi/2, while shifting the phase of negative portion of Fβu by pi/2;
(ii) adjusting amplitude, u2 = Pωu1: enlarging the amplitude nearby τi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
(iii) rotation of time-frequency plane, ue = Fαu2: counterclockwise rotation with an angle of
α of signal u2 from the time axis to x-axis around the origin in the time-frequency plane.
In this way, we triply encrypt the signal. If any one of the keys is erroneous, the original
signal cannot be reconstructed. In addition, there are various other options for mα and Tmα , such
as fractional Poisson integral operator, fractional Gauss-Weierstrass integral operator and so on.
6 Conclusion
FRFT is a powerful tool widely used in signal processing. In this work, we elaborated the
impact provided by altering the domain of the signals. We pointed out that the FRFT of an L1-
signal is usually noninvertible, and verified that the commonly used fast FRFT algorithm with
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complexity O(N log N) cannot recover it from the fractional Fourier domain to time domain.
Then we provided a double encryption algorithm based on the different properties of FRFT
in L1(R) and L2(R) spaces. We mapped the to-be-encrypted signal to a “bad” L1-signal and
obtained an encrypted signal by applying the FRFT. Here, the two keys are the function uω and
the order α. With the help of Abel and Gauss means of FRFT, we used the idea of identity
approximation to recover the encrypted signal from the fractional Fourier domain back to the
time domain. On the one hand, a large number of papers on signal encryption have shown
that using FRFT for signal encryption is extremely safe. On the other hand, using the FRFT
L1 theory established in [3], the encryption algorithm in this paper not only further improves
security, but also ensures the feasibility and accuracy of decryption. Finally we studied the
general idea of signal encryption combined with fractional Fourier multipliers, and looked at
the fractional Hilbert transform as an example.
In the numerical experiment, we combined the eigenvalue decomposition type algorithm
and fractional Abel means to encrypt the rectangular function as an example. The complexity
is O(N2). It is worth noting that the fast FRFT algorithm with complexity O(N log N) is not ap-
plicable here (see Fig. 4.2 (d)). To ensure accuracy, we compromised speed from O(N log N) to
O(N2). Algorithms with high precision and improved complexity require further investigation.
For the sake of simplicity, this article only studied the related problems of one-dimensional
signals. In fact, using a similar idea, one may establish the L1 identity approximation theory of
high-dimensional FRFT and apply it to image encryption. The idea in Theorem 3.1, combined
with [6, Theorem 1.12], seems to provide a new design of an encryption algorithm even in the
case of the classical Fourier transform.
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